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[1. Introduction] 
-- A Brief Overview of the Japanese Financial System 
To begin with, as a preliminary to our discussion, I 
would like to explain the characteristics of the Japanese 
financial system. Following this introduction I will 
discuss the changes in the financial markets in the 80's, 
the evaluation of Tokyo as an international financial 
center, and then I will summarize the future outlook of 
the Japanese system. 
One of the basic features of the Japanese financial 
system is the Securities and Exchange Law. This law is 
similar to the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States, 
which clearly separates commercial banking and investment 
banking. 
Traditionally, Japan had a universal banking system 
similar to that of European countries, in which banks are 
involved in both commercial and investment banking. After 
the end of World War II, U.S. occupation forces observed 
carefully the Japanese financial system, but did not 
embrace the universal banking practice. Instead they 
advised the Japanese government to adopt a system with a 
Glass-Steagall-type framework. 
Except for a few differences the American and Japanese 
regulations are similar. A major distinction is that 
commercial banks in Japan can hold common stock in their 
investment portfolios. 
This is probably considered a wise policy because in 
the late 1940s economic activities started from nothing 
(scratch). At that time, the institutional framework of 
the economy had been completely destroyed and all sectors 
badly needed capital to spur recovery. Banks played the 
role of stock market. 
However, under the antitrust law banks equity holdings 
are strictly controlled. Japan imported U.S. antitrust 
legal framework which embodied a strong feeling of 
populism against big business such as the Zaibatsu. Thus 
even though banks are allowed to hold equities they are 
not permitted to hold more than five percent of the total 
outstanding common shares of any company. 
Speaking of Glass-Steagall, a trend has been gaining 
momentum recently in both the United States and Japan to 
review the segregation of the banking and the securities 
businesses. Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banks have been 
to sidestep the Glass-Steagall Act. These subsidiaries 
have been aggressively participating in bond business as 
well as in stock business abroad where the Glass-Steagall 
Act is not applicable. 
Domestically, U.S. bank holding companies through 
subsidiaries are allowed to engage in handling commercial 
papers, as well as, underwriting and dealing revenue 
bonds, mortgage bonds and consumer credit-related asset 
back securities. Thus U.S. banks even now are in a 
position to engage in a considerable, if not full, range 
of activities in the securities business -- a fact that 
illustrates the waning significance of the Glass-Steagall 
Act. 
In November 1987 the financial modernization bill of 
1987 was presented to Congress jointly by Senator William 
Proxmire, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, and by 
Senator Jake Garn. This bill is intended to abolish part 
of the Glass-Steagall Act and allow banks and security 
houses to engage in business on each other's turf through 
holding companies. On March 2, after making some 
amendments the Senate Banking Committee approved the bill. 
In Japan the Financial System Review-Committee, a task 
force formed to review the issues related to the financial 
system, has expressed that it is too rigid to consider the 
separation of banking and the securities business as an 
immutable rule. This is a signal that the MOF might be 
flexible, when the U.S. system changes. 
Now, let me briefly describe the major characteristics 
of the Japanese banks and securities companies. 
--Characterictics 
(1) The Japanese Banking Industry 
The total number of existing banks in Japan is 
relatively small, compared with that of the United 
States. In the U.S. the FDIC has 14,000 member banks. 
There are only 156 member banks in Federation of Bankers 
Associations of Japan, 13 of which are large city banks. 
Thus, the Japanese banking industry consists of a 
relatively small group of highly competitive players. 
Historically, the banks competed within a framework of 
a strictly regulated interest rate structure. Thus, the 
traditional thrust for competition has been to 
quantatively expand loan assets as well as deposits, which 
is a quantitative game, not a qualitative one. 
However, with the advent of securitization and 
interest rate deregulation, signs of change have appeared 
in the way Japanese banks compete for expanded assets. 
They now have a completely different set of risk factors; 
in addition to the traditional credit risk, they have to 
cope with all kinds of market risks involved. Another 
important factor fueling the underlying trend is the move 
to establish an international standard of banks' capital 
adequacy ratio. In order to effectively monitor the 
capital adequancy ratio, you have to be much more 
sophisticated in controlling risks and in managing the 
relationship between assets and liabilities. A quality 
competition will become more vital than a quantity 
competition. 
Historically, however, Japanese commercial banks 
worked hard to pursue a quantitative competition by 
greatly expanding their lending activities, particularly 
during the high economic growth period of the 1960s and 
1970s. For Japanese corporations, external debt like bank 
borrowing was an important and normal source of funds 
under a given tax framework. During the high growth 
period, when the Japanese economy achieved 9% to 10% 
growth annually, 70% to 80% of total funds raised by 
business corporations came from bank borrowings. These 
borrowings enjoyed the advantage of tax benefits on 
interest payments. Japanese corporations preferred bank 
JLoanjL, for, among other reasons, they could easily be •_ 
custom-made (a JIT product!!). That's why Japanese 
corporate executives enjoyed "relationships" with their 
bankers. And vise versa. Financial transactions were 
traditionally relationship-oriented rather than 
price-oriented. 
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The oil crisis of 1973 marked a new era for the 
Japanese economy: it moved from a high growth period into 
a slow or stable growth period, resulting in diminished 
corporate demand for funds. Japan's economic growth rate 
since 1974 has averaged 3-4% a year, and bank borrowings 
as a share of the total funds raised by corporations has 
recently dropped to about 25% instead of the previous 
70-80%. Furthermore, corporate needs for financial 
services has become highly complex. As a result, it has 
become necessary for banks to perform not only commercial 
banking but also investment banking services in order to 
adequately serve corporate customer needs. 
In this regard, some argue that, in keeping up with 
the ongoing change in banking functions, Japanese banks 
will see a shift from relationship banking, the 
traditional practice, to price banking. I disagree. 
Maintaining a close relationship with clients is the basis 
of Japanese banks' activities. Not only are good and 
reliable banks dependable business information providers, 
they also provide information for risk management. Given 
this tradition, it is unlikely that even with the rising 
importance of the securitization business, relationship 
banking will easily change to price banking. 
(2) Japanese Securities Companies 
There are about 250 securities houses. The Big Four 
virtually monopolize about 80% of equity underwritings and 
about 70% of bond underwritings. Commissions paid on 
securities transactions are fixed and have not been 
deregulated. Furthermore, new entrants have been 
restricted. (The current annual pre-tax profit of Nomura 
Securities Co. is the equivalent of 2 billion dollars — 
much larger than the corresponding figure of the.largest 
bank.) 
Soon, the division between the commercial banking 
business and the securities business will be partially 
mitigated in Japan. Japanese bankers were interested in 
the verdict of the U.S. court case regarding commercial 
paper placement by Bankers Trust. Last June, the Federal 
Appeals Court ruled that the private placement of 
commercial paper should not be interpreted as 
"underwriting", and therefore bankers were allowed to 
proceed in this business. The Supreme Court concurred 
with this decision. —^" 
Thus the U.S. banking industry will legally be able to 
step into the securities business or investment banking in 
a decisive manner even within the Glass-Steagall 
framework. And it seems to me that bank regulatory 
authorities in the United States are increasingly in favor 
of this. 
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The U.S. environment should eventually affect the 
Japanese environment. It should be a typical example of 
"ideology transfer". Even though both the U.S. and Japan 
Glass-Steagall frameworks may endure for a few more years, 
the policy climate of financial authorities will be 
substantially liberalized in both countries. 
[2. Changes in the Tokyo Financial Markets in the 1980s 1 
Now let us look at the changes taking place in the 
Tokyo financial markets in the '80s. The liberalization 
and internationalization of the Tokyo financial markets 
has been remarkable since the early 1980s. These moves 
were triggered by the 1980 revision of the Foreign 
Exchange Control Act and the 1982 revision of the Banking 
Law. The inprinciple liberalization of capital 
transactions, implemented with the revision of the Foreign 
Exchange Control Act, had a particularly strong impact. 
The agreement reached in 1984 by the Japan-U.S. Yen-Dollar 
Ad Hoc Committee, Financial and Capital Market Issues, 
further spurred the trend toward financial liberalization. 
The liberalization and internationalization of the 
Tokyo financial markets can be divided into four 
categories of action: (1) deregulation of interest rates, 
(2) liberalization of domestic financial markets, (3) 
opening up of the Tokyo markets to foreign financial 
institutions, and (4) internationalization of the yen. 
(1) Liberalizaion of Interest Rates on Deposits 
Interest rate deregulation is being implemented in 
steps, to avoid pushing the domestic markets into 
disarray. Deregulation began in 1985 with 
large-denomination time deposits of Yl billion and over, 
followed by incremental lowering of the deposits' 
denominations. Interest rate on Y100 million and over 
time deposits are the most recently deregulated. In April 
1988, interest rates on time deposits of Y50 million and 
over are scheduled to be deregulated. 
(2) Liberalization of Domestic Financial Markets 
Now the liberalization of domestic financial markets 
has occurred in the form of diversification of financial 
instruments and services. On the financial instrument 
front,—Ge4^t4£i.catc of -JepusiL issues were liberalized in-T 
1979, ushering in the age of market liberalizaion, and in 
1987 domestic commercial paper issues were liberalized. 
The commercial paper market was worth about Y2 trillion at 
the end of last January, reaching this size only three 
months after its inauguration. Indeed, except for 
short-term government bonds, the Tokyo financial markets 
today can match those in the U.S. and Western Europe in a 
variety of short-term financial instruments. 
Measures have also been taken to deregulate 
yen-denominated loans to foreign borrowers and to relax 
rules governing the issuance of yen-denominated bonds. 
As the result, the yen's share of the international 
financial market during the first seven months of 1987 was 
about 13%, compared with almost 40% share by the U.S. 
dollar. And utilization of Yen denominated financing 
actually exceeds that of the D mark's 8% share. 
Therefore, the appetite for Yen is gradually growing. 
But/ the U.S. dollar remains ,of course, the key currency 
in the global capital market. International investors' 
portofolios are obviously based on U.S. dollar. 
[3. Evaluation of Tokyo as an International Financial Center] 
As financial globalization is progressing, New York, 
Tokyo and London are becoming the major international 
finance centers. As a matter of fact, Tokyo is now really 
gaining momentum to grow as the third nucleus. This 
contrasts sharply with Tokyo's historical image as only a 
local market as compared with the central markets in New 
York and London. 
I would like to show you the comparative size of the 
Tokyo financial markets in four different categories: (1) 
money market, (2) debt markets (bank credit + bond 
issues), (3) equity market, and (4) foreign exchange 
market. 
The outstanding value of Tokyo's short-term money 
market instruments at the end of last September was about 
$520 billion. This is about one-third New York's volume 
(NY is of course the largest market). However, Tokyo is 
about five times the size of the London market. 
How about the debt market? Tokyo's bank credit 
outstandings are about $1 trillion which is higher than 
New York's market. Of course, New York is the market 
leader for bond issuance (the real flower of capitalism) 
with $4.5 trillion outstanding. Tokyo's bond issuance 
market is at $1.5 trillion and thus it is roughly 
one-third the size of the New York market. 
Indeed, the magnitude of the New York market is best 
portrayed by the capitalization value of the New York : 
^tock hixcriange ($2.2 trillion) . However, today, the ' • 
market capitalization of Tokyo is bigger than that of the 
NYSE. 
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Speaking of the volume of foreign exchange 
transactions, London is primarily known as enjoying the 
highest status, which is actually at $90 billion a day, 
and is double that of both New York and Tokyo. 
How can the comparisons of these markets be 
characterized? London can be described as a "graceful old 
matron", with fancy Forex attire; while New York is 
definitely a "Gulliver", with flexing short term money 
market muscles and a strong body, made up of an equity and 
a debt market. Tokyo can best be described as an 
"unexpected beauty", her money market muscles still young 
but developing, her bank credit eyes are very big and 
shining, while her "securities" hair is unexpectedly 
gorgeous. 
To further illustrate the perception of Tokyo's 
expected growth I would like to cite interesting results 
of the Japan Center for International Finance surveys. 
JCIF asked representatives of foreign financial 
institutions in Tokyo to rate the Tokyo markets in 
comparison to London and New York. The survey taken in 
1984 ranked the London market as top of the three. 
However, when a similar survey was conducted in 1987, 
assuming London was 100 Tokyo's index rose to 62 and New 
York's was up to 115. In the 1987 survey, the respondents 
were also asked to forecast the future importance of the 
three markets in 1992. Tokyo was placed ahead of London, 
and just behind New York. As stated before these 
perceptions are those of "foreign" bankers and financial 
experts doing business in Tokyo. 
One reason for Tokyo's high rating is the successful 
liberalization and internationalization of the Japanese 
financial markets. Another important reason is ,of 
course, the growing accumulation of Japanese dollars, 
which is eventually destined to be recycled abroad. This 
implies enormous business opportunities. 
If you look at past statistics, Japanese real GNP 
growth rate during the golden years of the '60s was 10%. 
This growth was taken for granted. The current growth 
rate in the '80s has dropped to 4%, which has become our 
cruising speed. While experiencing these rough changes, 
Japanese industries have continuously raised productivity 
and remained comj^ eJ^ Lj^ iy^  
—nraTTrjrfacTurTngTl^^ 
As a matter of fact, if you look back to the '50s and 
'60s, Japan's industries depended on the expansion of 
domestic markets; this phenomenon was widely misunderstood 
by foreign Japanologists, many of whom still believe that 
export-led expansion is part of Japan's indigenous culture. 
Second, with the establishment of an offshore market 
and with preparations under way to create a financial 
futures market, Tokyo is becoming fully equipped as an 
international financial center. Cash market and futures 
market are indeed indispensable wheels to roll on any 
financial center. So far, only a government bond futures 
market exists, but preparations are being made to start a 
comprehensive financial futures market. A market where a 
wide variety of instruments will be traded, including 
interest rate and currency futures, currency options, 
stock price index futures, and U.S. Treasury bond 
futures. Another important vehicle in Japan's financial 
center is the Japan Offshore Market(JOM), modeled after 
the New York IBF, created in 1986. 
Thirdly, Tokyo's geographical position is important. 
Tokyo is located between New York and London (!). When the 
New York market closes in the evening, the San Francisco 
market is still open for another 3 hours. Four o'clock in 
San Francisco is 9 o'clock in Tokyo. When Tokyo closes at 
5 in the evening, it is 9 in Brussels and Zurich and 8 in 
the morning in London. 
Therefore, financial markets in New York, Tokyo and 
London are ideally located for 24-hour transactions. 
Also, Tokyo is supplied with well-trained human 
resources as well as high-tech communications devices, and 
the level of information is high in both quantity and 
quality. This "financial infrastructure" is the key to 
the success of any international financial center. Of 
course, we are also well equipped with an "entertainment 
infrastructure". Not only do we have Ginza & Akasaka, but 
we also attract such productions as Chorus Line, Cats and 
now Phantom of the Opera. Today, Harold Prince is busy in 
Tokyo. 
Tokyo is expected to perform its part as one of the 
three financial centers of the world and at the same time 
to function as the key station in Asia. The increase in 
the importance of New York, Tokyo, and London as 
international financial center does not mean that 
financial activities concentrate in New York, Tokyo and 
London; what it means is that each of these three 
financial centers functions as the key station for its 
region. This means that sai^ T-J^ L^te^ ma^ ^ 
-e^ h^~dHrrrarrc±a 1 cerrter^ IrT-the-casTe of Tokyo, it will be 
called on to fulfill its role as the center of the Asian 
galaxy. 
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The Japanese ecomony has already started a sound 
movement toward a positive restructuring by means of 
expanding domestic markets. We need careful policy 
coordination. If the United Stated fails to seriously 
address the issue of readjusting its twin deficits in 
order to put its economy on a healthy path, uneasiness may 
erode confidence in the dollar and also undermine the 
future role of the Tokyo financial markets, hindering 
their function as a stable supply base of funds. The U.S. 
financial market now depends on Japan for one-third of all 
long term funds flowing in from overseas. The future role 
of Tokyo depends on a healthy management of the U.S. 
economic policy. We have to know that we are all on the 
same boat. And we must avoid any kind of future crisis 
due to the lack of policy coordination. 
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